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About us. Stay updated. Corporate Social Responsiblity. Investor Relations. Review a Brill Book. Popular unrest is a source of worry also for seemingly stable authoritarian regimes. Young faces have become the image of protest in Russia over the last two years, and they convey the importance of protests that may emerge in any authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what kind of young people are taking to the street and how their mobilisation is judged by their peers. This paper draws on survey data from and on the political attitudes of young Russians alongside focus group interviews generated in in Yekaterinburg and St.
It is argued that young Russians of different political orientation agree that Putin has been in power for too long and that also regime supporters do not, in principle, oppose regime critical protests. Rather, supporters insist on the importance for protests to be officially approved but question the genuine political nature of oppositional mobilisation. Friendship networks and institutional trust emerge as the key variables for understanding assessment of protests.
The global visibility of young people over the last years in protest movements shows the extent to which such protests have become a source of potential trouble for nondemocratic and democratic governments alike Hollyer et al.
Indeed, protests may affect how citizens evaluate politics, and they are therefore observed with great attention by the political elites.
Because young people are more likely to participate in protests, some post-Soviet states have attempted to mobilise them in state-controlled movements. In order to pre-empt their desire to express themselves politically, the Russian regime has attempted to channel their political activities via pro-governmental youth organisations Hemment , Lassila and patriotic education Sanina It is striking how young people — frequently of school age — have come to dominate the image of Russian protests since the presidential elections of Indeed, protests have become frequent and extremely diverse, relating to the uncovering of high-level corruption by Alexei Navalny and his team alongside numerous local protests that make specific demands — changes in the use of urban recreational areas, construction programmes affecting residential areas, or the management of waste.
But even a high number of separate local protests will not necessarily translate into a broader movement against the regime Lasnier : Meanwhile, this diversity in demands defies binary readings of Russian society being either pro- or anti-Putin. The visibility of protests since significantly contrasts with what seemed like very little citizen activism, be this in demonstrations or civil society, in the former Warsaw Pact countries during the s Bernhagen and Marsh , Howard , including youth activism Ekiert and Kubik , Vanhuysse Meanwhile, global changes in the demands and strategies of protests have also affected Russia — a movement such as Fridays for Future has a small but vocal presence, and new forms of mobilisation, such as one-person pickets, have gained visibility via transnational social media.
This article argues that young people, even those who express support for the political system in place, lack enthusiasm for the current regime. The focus groups convey however deep divides between the different fractions of youth who diverge in their views on what kind of protest is legitimate and useful, and whether existing protests should be considered as being political in nature. This paper first discusses the literature on protests with a focus on Russia to develop three aspects related to protest legitimacy, the politicisation of protest, and the characteristics of protesters.
It then goes on to present the data and analytic strategy, which is followed by a discussion of the results. First, it is argued that from to protests were increasingly seen as legitimate; over both years, friendship networks played a crucial role in explaining this assessment.
Second, the question of the political nature of protest is an important topic of debate for the assessment of their legitimacy, and a strategy used by the authorities to dismiss protests as irrelevant. On the other hand, protesters themselves, while asserting the political nature of their activities, point out that they are not seeking radical political demands and instead de-politicise their claims. Third, to understand participation in protests, network effects are decisive, whereas socioeconomic variables play an insignificant role in understanding protest participation.
The section begins with a discussion of the role of protests in contemporary Russia. It then proceeds to elaborate three specific themes for understanding how young people perceive of protests and their participation therein. Dissenting protests by young people are powerful symbols of a regime failing to relate to society.
Time and again, young people mobilised against an established order have pressured politicians and contributed to the near downfall of political systems Krawatzek Nevertheless, most protests, not only in Russia, do not lead to regime change. This pluralism among elites is even more exposed within society and is important to recognise, since oppositional protests do not simply lead to support for regime challengers.
Although opposition protests tend to reduce support for the ruling regime Hale and Colton , Hollyer et al. Elections are one key type of event that may lead to protests. Although elections in Russia and other post-Soviet countries see especially low turnout from young people, during elections these may express their political view also outside of the electoral arena.
Put differently, even low-salience elections may raise the salience of politics in society, and therefore make political demands more likely to be voiced. Overall, the opportunity structures that Russian and, earlier, Soviet activists face, have evolved considerably over time Williams With a gradual policy shift in the aftermath of the State Duma elections, intimidation and public discrediting of oppositional figures have started to become more frequent.
Activism is frequently forbidden, and protests are not authorised and often punished with short detentions. Protests involve the risk of suffering personal violence and require considerable personal commitment. Withdrawal from political mobilisation against the regime has therefore come to be the default response Brunarska : Passivity seems like the most rational response to even the harshest economic or political crisis, since the personal benefit of protest tends to be largely outweighed by the personal cost.
Thus, compliance, particularly in autocracies, prevails Koesel and Bunce Nevertheless, when regional authorities initiated the construction of a church in the centre of Yekaterinburg, mass protests carried by young people spread across the city; likewise, when several opposition candidates were denied registration during the regional elections in September , this gave rise to some of the most significant mobilisations of the last decade in Russia.
Public opinion is another opportunity structure and hard to shift when the media landscape is one-sided and therefore does not allow information to circulate. In the Russian context, the media reiterates the interpretive master frames of the Kremlin itself; for alternative viewpoints, citizens have to turn to various online media.
As for civic activism, Gladarev and Lonkila, using online and offline ethnography, demonstrate how online and offline reinforce one another. The freedoms that VKontakte, the leading Russian social media site, offered around was critical for the recruitment, information, and mobilisation of activists Since the —12 electoral cycle, however, the Russia authorities have started to increasingly control online media.
Nikolayenko, for instance, shows the centrality of patriotism during the marches against the military intervention in Donbas Tellingly, the Moscow middle class has been characterised as embodying a weak demand for democracy combined with a reluctance to participate in mass actions Dmitriev This silent majority, the attitudes of the broader population, influences how the regime can respond to protests, since public opinion matters to authoritarian regimes, which adopt certain policies in response to attitudes among citizens Chen and Xu , Greene and Robertson , Truex Moreover, the silent majority indicates the extent to which people think they can change something in the environment they inhabit through protests Brown Protests are often divisive and young people tend to have a clear view on whether they consider protests as legitimate or not.
These assessments of the legitimacy of protests provide a foundation for views on the nature of protests and potential participation in them. The social environment of young people is critical for understanding their view on protests. In that regard, friendship networks — and whether or not discussions therein are of a political nature — go a long way in understanding how a person relates to ongoing political events.
Kharkhordin identifies an abundance of personal friendship in Russia, one that presupposes that both parties are genuine, equal, and disinterested These friendship circles are of political relevance as controversial political debates are indeed more common among friends and colleagues, than in the private family realm Krawatzek and Sasse : 6.
Irrespective of whether such networks form political opinions, or whether previously held political opinions form networks, it is indisputable that there is significant convergence between the two Lazer et al. Alongside, trust in the political system is a crucial variable, although the precise relationship between political trust and protest legitimacy remains disputed Hooghe and Marien While it seems plausible that a certain level of trust is required to think of protests as legitimate, just as any other form of engagement in the political process Almond and Verba , different mechanisms may apply in authoritarian regimes.
Indeed, in such situations the inverse might work, with institutional distrust supporting views on protests as providing an alternative to the political processes in place. Young Russians are aware of what is happening abroad, but it remains unclear whether their personal or mediated experiences make them more or less likely to endorse these other realities. Second, is protest seen as actually being about political issues or rather dismissed as a social opportunity for young people?
This aspect of the evaluation of protest links in important ways with the questions of legitimacy but takes place in a very specific Russian context. One strategy of the regime is to dismiss protests as not being about political issues, but rather as being carried by frustrated and isolated individuals or irresponsible teenagers.
In this way, the Kremlin dismisses protests and civic activism more broadly as radical, rather than as reflecting legitimate political demands. Accordingly, the contours of acceptable civic activism are clearly defined, and citizens are expected to position themselves as supporting partners of the regime Flikke This depoliticisation of protest as a strategy has important repercussions into broader society.
It also adds to current literature, which has generally viewed protests as an expression of the politicisation of society. Others have taken the general visibility of protests as indicating politicisation. Because protests capture media attention, they increase the visibility of the political in the public sphere and expand the number of actors involved in politics Dolezal However, how citizens themselves engage with the question of politicisation, and how it impacts on their assessment of protest, has thus far been little studied.
Third, what kind of individual overcomes the collective-action problem in a context in which it is nearly impossible to believe in a favourable response by the authorities? People who self-position on the left are the ones who are more likely to participate in protest, although this relationship has varied over time Opp et al. Meanwhile, some level of trust is crucial for protest participation.
Benson and Rochon demonstrate that interpersonal trust links with more positive assessments of the potential protest benefits and reduces the anticipated costs of protest participation Indeed, those who understand protest as being carried by more integrated members of a society, motivated by their belief in social justice, support this claim McAdam [] and argue that interpersonal trust relates positively to protest participation Hetherington However, other parts of the literature have assumed that those who protest are disgruntled individuals Buechler , since people who feel alienated are less likely to participate in voting and other conventional political activities Gilliam and Kaufmann , Kuklinski and Chong , Tate Moreover, institutional trust relates to protest participation.
Protests may even increase levels of institutional trust, as individuals update their view on institutions Frye and Borisova Another important aspect for understanding protest participation is the specific local context. Alongside the broader national mood, the local context plays into the kind of opportunity structures that individuals perceive and shapes political attitudes Weatherford Local information is often more socially relevant, since it is endowed with emotions and can therefore be more easily remembered and related to Weyland Under conditions of uncertainty, elements that allow recognition are helpful in enabling decision-making Kahneman et al.
Meanwhile, the local context also sustains the social networks, which are at the core of any protest movement Diani Accordingly, those among the Moscow middle class who were involved in the protests against elections in and played an important role in changing how neighbours and friends relate to the political system Chaisty and Whitefield , Dmitriev , Robertson Moreover, as a comparison of Yaroslavl and Tatarstan has shown, the political attitudes of regional leaders matter in shaping the possibility and character of mobilisation Brunarska : This study uses two cross-sectional online surveys conducted among urban youth across Russian cities with more than one million inhabitants in April and April The sample size was proportional to the size of the city population.
A more or less vibrant university and associational life, which gives young people opportunities to get socially and politically involved, characterises all of these cities. Claims about changes over time in a cross-sectional survey are to be made with caution given the fact that individuals between the respective samples differ. In the present case, the quotas contributed to two samples that are identical in terms of age, gender, place of residence, income and employment status.
However, respondents in the sample indicated on average a lower level of education. While surveys are most suited to understanding broader structures of public opinion, they are less able to get into the complex micro-foundations revealing the origins of political attitudes. This paper therefore complements the survey data through twelve focus groups conducted in two Russian cities. In June , six groups were realised in Yekaterinburg and St. Petersburg respectively. In both cities, people were sampled into the groups based on two criteria: their political outlook and age.
The first — political — dimension distinguished between those expressing support for, those opposed to, and those indifferent to the regime.
People with these three distinct outlooks on the regime were kept separate to avoid self-censoring of potentially sensitive discussions. Along a second dimension, I distinguished participants by age, separating people aged 18—24 and those aged 25— A professional moderator conducted the groups, relying on a detailed questionnaire that I prepared and discussed with her beforehand. One significant section of the discussions explored questions of protest legitimacy, personal experience with protests, and views on pro-regime mobilisation.
Each of the twelve groups lasted for around two hours. The focus groups were transcribed and coded with Maxqda to structure the material and assist in the interpretation.
Combining focus group and quantitative analyses remains rare, although promising to understand protest Dmitriev Do young Russians consider protests as being legitimate? Respondents could also skip the question as all other survey questions. A split into three separate models conveys the complex relationship between institutional trust, friendship networks, and protest assessments, in particular for those who sometimes or never find protest legitimate. The three response categories were recoded as binary dependent variables for logistic regressions, and the main explanatory variables included those related to political trust a binary variable for trust in the president and the use of state media as first or second source of information , friendship networks a scale for the frequency of political discussions with friends, a dummy variable for whether an individual knows other people who participated in protests , and lastly a dummy variable to capture migration intentions.
A conventional set of control variables was used, including one to capture whether the response came from The probability of finding protests always legitimate in compared to substantively increased by more than two third, even if socioeconomic factors were controlled for Table 1. Alongside a general increase in protest approval, factors related to political trust stand out, notably in relation to the president. High trust was expressed by individuals who were significantly less likely to always support protests, but it is intriguing that other young people with high trust are more likely to support some form of protest, raising the question of what kind of events people associate with protests.
An additional factor was the consumption of state media. Respondents who did not consult state media were substantially more likely to disapprove of protests in general. The survey asked about the frequency of political discussions with friends and colleagues and whether they knew people who participated in protests.
These two factors are highly significant: having an acquaintance who has participated in protests doubles the probability of finding protests legitimate and the frequency of political discussions that young people engage in relates to one third higher probability of approving of protests. These two factors obviously interrelate and are likely to develop simultaneously.
Young Russians who desire to leave the country generally have a more positive view on the legitimacy of protests than their peers. If we control for socioeconomic characteristics Table 1 , models 2, 4 and 6 , the effects of the attitudinal variables do not vanish. Contrary to some of the findings in the literature discussed above, we find no effect for age, income, education, and being a student. However, being male increases the likelihood of viewing protest as legitimate.
The focus group material enriches these patterns. Although protests in Russia do not simply map on to a Navalny-Putin dichotomy, this picture was one that everyone could relate to and it provided an effective trigger for the discussion of protest attitudes more broadly.
The second picture exemplified a pro-government mobilisation, in this case one of the Immortal Regiment marches. These commemorative marches started as a grass-roots initiative and were subsequently co-opted by the Russian state Fedor Young people agreed, irrespective of their political preferences, that Putin has been in power for too long. There was, however, significant disagreement on whether or not protests were an appropriate response to that situation.
Among participants in the groups who self-identified as supporters and indifferent, opinions ranged from outright opposition to protest as a practice of political expression to the belief that protests were pointless, since they were unlikely to lead to change.
Participants in both groups who had no personal contact to someone who had protested questioned the legitimacy of any kind of mobilisation. And those who were not opposed in principle would argue that it was pointless. Oh well, once this tsar is overthrown, another one will come along. A conviction that protesters were paid also delegitimised protests in the eyes of regime supporters.
Inversely, individuals who had participated in protests either criticised a biased media or had completely stopped following state-controlled media. The limitations of state media were a concern shared by some in the pro-regime or indifferent groups.
They acknowledged that the media failed to provide equal access, and distorted political and social developments. In Yekaterinburg, demonstrations against the building of a church had taken place just prior to the focus group interviews. But looking at how it was covered in the news across the country, it was barely mentioned. I think it is really problematic to find out about rallies in the country if you do not search purposefully and do not have friends there.
The quantitative evidence indicates that supporters of the regime sometimes approve of protests. In the pro-regime groups, people also spoke about the importance of criticising the authorities on specific points. MLf I believe citizens must express their positions. They must express their support for the government if they really think that the government is good…. If they oppose it, then they should go and say that they are against some aspect.
But you cannot be against the system, because one is part of the system, and the system will not change anyway. But you should express your opinion with others, so that your ideas are conveyed to the authorities. A recurring theme among regime supporters was the need for protests to be approved. They opposed what they perceived as radical, disorderly, and chaotic mass mobilisation. Regime-supportive AKf18 expressed an opinion shared by many in her group, namely that, while protest is probably the only way to put pressure on the government, only approved protests are legitimate expressions of society.
Moreover, she opposed any use of violence during protests, and suggested that opposition could be expressed through art, rather than aggression. Speaking to the role of friendship networks, those who had already participated in protests, or had friends who have been involved, expressed a generally positive view on protests of any kind. DIm27 explained:. I believe that everyone is hurt, that is to say, I do not think that people come to rallies for some selfish reasons. There are political beliefs, I mean, sometimes to genuinely support someone there.
Here, people are really dissatisfied with the government, so they come out and show this. AShm This [protests] is the only effective way to influence the government at the moment, because we do not have any meaningful elections. Nobody is going to listen to an opinion you express on the internet, in letters or other messages. Only a rally can clearly show the state of mass opinion, and a rally puts pressure on the government. These friendship networks are a key factor in what people make of protests.
Young people regularly referred to friends who went on the street and who were sincerely committed. These network effects shape the evaluation of protests, as statements from St. Petersburg illustrate. As I know, people who come out to [oppositional] rallies are genuinely doing so on their own initiative.
Personally, my grandmother always goes, and for her this is a way to preserve the real memory. The international component shined through some focus groups.
However, those who knew about these protests did not necessarily endorse them. The intention to migrate that individuals stated during the groups could not, however, be related to their attitudes regarding protests. Even young people who support the regime on paper share the opinion that Putin has been in power for too long and do not necessarily question the legitimacy of protest.
Instead, they also criticise the authorities but insist on the need to get official approval for protests, out of fear of chaos and violence. The importance for friendship networks in the evaluation of protests is conveyed in the quantitative and qualitative data alongside the increase in protest approval from to From the question of whether or not protests have a political legitimacy ensues the following discussion about protest assessments.
Is participation in protest carried by politicised individuals or rather, as often claimed by Russian authorities, by individuals who simply disrespect established norms? And are protests seen as an expression of the politicisation of society or dismissed as a waste of time? Regarding politicisation, the discussions that took place during the focus groups reveal much about the dynamics among young Russians today.
The debate over the political nature of protest, or its lack, is itself a key component in the interpretive struggle over whether or not protests are legitimate. Local activists in Russia tend to frame their own engagement as non-political and some even consider themselves as politically indifferent when they get involved in activism addressing local shortcomings.
Rare are those activists who openly make their claims in political narratives Tykanova and Khokhlova Young people who have protested, however, are clearly convinced of the political nature of protests.
This expresses that we are treated like children, but we have already grown up, and nothing has changed, nothing has happened, there is strictly no improvement. People themselves try to bring something in, but they are not allowed to do so. A slightly longer discussion between older focus group participants underlines the importance of protests precisely because of their political nature.
AAm This is despair, anger, hatred, simply because how much can you fool people? This was the situation after the elections. They understand that they were fooled. The results of the election were simply drawn on a piece of paper. Nobody wanted to make him be the president. AAm Yes, but then I read a post that it was no more than thirty percent and that the numbers were then changed. They are not timid; they are spreading their vision.
They are fooling us right in front of our eyes. Every day they spit on our soul. Clearly, people are already tired of enduring this. And how much of it can you endure? ITm I think that people really want a change of government, simply because one person has been in there for such a long time.
Opposed to this interpretation of the political character of protests were the views in the two other groups. Among those that self-identified as being politically indifferent, somewhat vague expressions and a clear lack of knowledge about protests stood out.
Participants in that group rarely expressed support for Putin, but also felt that he had ruled for too long. What is important, however, is that the various groups hardly differed in terms of what they expected from the government. Nevertheless, differences of views within the indifferent and regime-supportive groups were bound to be large.
The older participants in the indifferent group in St. Petersburg, for instance, acknowledged the political nature of protests, but they added that these protests were pointless, since nothing was going to change in response to street mobilisation.
The age of protesters was a frequent topic of debate in the indifferent and pro-regime groups. Here, the young age of the protesters tended to delegitimise the protests. Asked about a possible dialogue with youth, ETf31 dismissed their demands:. Someone agitated them. Among them, there are no conscientious adults. The thing is that a wise politician has been building our political system for years now.
It is simply impossible to set the country on a new path in four to eight years; much more time is required for that.
Put a new one in place. But who really believes that a new person would change the situation in Russia within a year? Among the indifferent and in particular the regime-loyal young people, a central line of criticism was the unpolitical nature of protests. These young people did not accept the politicisation of protest.
They remarked instead that the young people who got involved were simply driven by excitement rather than the pursuit of a genuine political goal. Instead, they simply derive pleasure from their involvement. They do not want to show their position. Instead they are simply emotional and search for this kind of adrenaline.
Among regime supporters, such statements were frequent and convey their little understanding of and interest for protests of any kind. Protests were dismissed as irrelevant, and their political nature was disputed. Supporters of the regime also claimed repeatedly that participation in protests was a source of income.
They were paid, so they went out. The focus groups convey in a striking way that only a very small number of individuals is against the protests because they genuinely support the political regime in place.
Even those who voted for the current president agree with some regime-critical viewpoints, although they would expect that anti-governmental demonstrations should be authorised: regime-loyal AKf18 acknowledged that. So people need to do it [protest].
Similarly, VPf29 from the indifferent group in St. Petersburg stated that people generally took to the streets too late and that protest was therefore becoming meaningless — however, she also underlined that in her opinion people had the right to question the state, to express their opinions freely and to try to achieve a compromise with the state. What are the characteristics of individuals who participate in protests?
The survey included questions enquiring into political and social as well as environmental protests, which were dummy-coded to perform a logistic regression using standard socioeconomic indicators as control variables. A second set of models Table 2 , models 3 and 4 extended the analysis to understand what factors other than socioeconomic indicators — political values, trust and local context — link with protest behaviour. Furthermore, in both years, people younger than twenty-five were more likely to participate in protests, with a larger effect for political protests.
Men were twice as likely to get involved in political protests, with no gender distinction for environmental protests. Those with a higher self-declared purchasing power were more than twice as likely to be involved in environmental protests, but not in political protests.
Level of education or being a student was not statistically significant in the analysis. If we extend the model to include other socio-political factors Table 2 , models 3 and 4 , the effects of age disappear, and the role of gender and income weakens. Instead, the role of the three dimensions of political values, trust and local context stands out. Respondents who agreed with multiculturalist viewpoints were twice as likely to have participated in protests of any kind.
Petersburg, SFf24 reflected a somewhat multicultural outlook when she criticised the imposition of religiosity, which the controversy over the church building in Yekaterinburg illustrated:. I am now personally concerned about the issue of how churches and temples are being built in Yekaterinburg, and how parks are demolished.
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